Adding Fuel to the Fire: United States v. Booker and the Crack versus Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity by Nelson, Briton K.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 4 Allen Chair Symposium: State of the
Chesapeake Bay in the Twenty-First Century
Article 8
5-1-2006
Adding Fuel to the Fire: United States v. Booker and
the Crack versus Powder Cocaine Sentencing
Disparity
Briton K. Nelson
University of Richmond School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, and
the Legislation Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Briton K. Nelson, Adding Fuel to the Fire: United States v. Booker and the Crack versus Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity, 40 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 1161 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss4/8
ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE: UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER AND THE CRACK VERSUS POWDER
COCAINE SENTENCING DISPARITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The sentencing structures for crack and powder cocaine have
been dramatically different since the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
19861 established a 100:1 ratio as the penalty differential be-
tween the two drugs, and set the same punishment for five grams
of crack as for five hundred grams of powder cocaine.2 The ratio
was followed in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Sentenc-
ing Guidelines") and has evoked considerable criticism over the
past twenty years.3 Litigants have challenged the ratio in courts,
judges have expressed their displeasure with the ratio, and the
United States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commis-
sion" or the "Commission") has issued three reports to Congress
disapproving of the ratio.4 Still, offenders have been consistently
sentenced according to the once mandatory Sentencing Guide-
lines following the ratio.
In January 2005, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in United States v. Booker,' effectively rendering the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory instead of mandatory, as they once were.6 Al-
though the 100:1 ratio lives on in the mandatory minimums, the
Sentencing Guidelines would often provide for a sentence harsher
than the mandatory minimum. Now, courts have the flexibility to
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines when dealing with the
1. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
2. § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-3.
3. See Editorial, Crack Cocaine Sentencing Inequity, N.J. L.J., Aug. 1, 2005 ("A cho-
rus of voices from commentators, courts, and the Sentencing Commission itself has criti-
cized the grossly unequal sentences.").
4. See discussion infra Part II.D.
5. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6. Id. at 245-46.
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crack/powder disparity.' The courts may use a lower ratio, as the
Sentencing Commission and numerous scholars and judges have
suggested, provided that they still abide by the mandatory mini-
mum set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).8
In order to understand fully where the Booker decision leaves
us with respect to the crack/powder debate, it is necessary to un-
derstand the background of cocaine and the history leading up to
Booker. To that end, Part II of this comment will discuss the his-
tory and background of cocaine, including a brief history of drug
use, a comparison of crack and powder cocaine, the formation of
the 100:1 ratio, and responses to the ratio's formation since 1986.
Part III will analyze the topic of sentencing without guidelines,
sentencing after the imposition of the Sentencing Guidelines, and
the erosion of the Guidelines leading up to Booker. Part IV will
then combine the two broad topics and analyze the impact that
the Booker decision will likely have on the ongoing debate over
the penalties for crack and powder cocaine. It will explain how
the decision adds more momentum to the debate, and argue that
it adds enough fuel to the fire to encourage changes to the current
penalty structure.
II. COCAINE BACKGROUND
A. History
To understand the current drug laws and the debate over how
crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses are punished, it is
helpful to briefly look at the history of drug use in America and
the reasons that people turn to drugs. The "national crisis of the
first order"9 surrounding the crack "epidemic" ° that prompted the
7. See Editorial, supra note 3 ("United States district courts are no longer bound to
impose the extraordinarily harsh Guideline sentences on sellers of crack cocaine.").
8. See infra Part IV.
9. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1286 (1995); see also RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
SENTENCING WITH DISCRETION: CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER 8 (2006),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crackcocaine-afterbooker.pdf (explain-
ing that media coverage portraying crack cocaine as a "plague," "epidemic," and "crisis"
provided the atmosphere for the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986).
10. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 121 (1995), avail-
1162 [Vol. 40:1161
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
strict mandatory minimums found in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
198611 did not just come out of nowhere and take the nation by
surprise; rather, the beginnings became apparent shortly after
World War II, largely with heroin use. 12 In the years following the
war, heroin had been "embraced," and "[tihe drug scene had be-
come the arena of 'happening' America." 3
The current American drug problem does not have only one
cause, but is rooted in complex conditions that lead to drug use.'4
Likewise, the spread of the drug problem is the result of a num-
ber of factors taken together. 5 The escalation of the drug crisis
largely took place in the 1980s-the "age of crack.""6 Cocaine was
President Ronald Reagan's primary target in his initiative
against drugs, which, owing to the drug-related deaths of Len
Bias and Don Rogers,' 7 was largely influenced by the increased
visibility of a national drug problem."8
Four models have been suggested to explain why people may
turn to drugs, and why, in the 1980s, the United States experi-
enced the crack epidemic: the status model, the coping model, the
structure model, and the saturation model.'9 The status model re-
flects a "fascination" with the crack lifestyle;2 ° the coping model
able at http://www.ussc.gov/cracklexec.htm [hereinafter 1995 REPORT].
11. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1286 (referring
to the penalties as "the stiffest, in many respects, in the history of American narcotics
laws").
12. See ELLIOT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE
36 (1993) ("The American drug crisis didn't suddenly spring up, full-blown with the cocaine
epidemic of the eighties."); see also JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS 23 (1986)
(commenting that in the early 1950s, the image of a drug user was a heroin addict in the
urban ghetto).
13. INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 28.
14. See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 67 (explaining the roots of drug use as a response to
complex, "multilayered" conditions including unemployment, and poverty, especially rela-
tive poverty).
15. See id. at 76 (citing "deepening poverty, declining labor markets" and "eroding
families" all "within a context of widening inequality, government retrenchment, and a
spreading culture of predatory consumerism" as key factors).
16. Id. at 75.
17. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 10, at 121. Len Bias and Don Rogers were two well-
known sports figures, and so their deaths received much media attention and caused pub-
lic concern.
18. See DAVID BOYUM & PETER REUTER, AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. DRUG
POLICY 7 (2005).
19. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 104.
20. Id. at 110.
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connects the idea that daily life is tougher in deprived communi-
ties with drug use;21 the structure model views drug use as pro-
viding "structure and purpose" to the lives of those who may lack
that elsewhere;22 and the saturation model presents the perhaps
bleak view that drug use may become so common that it is no
longer "planned or consciously chosen."23 The policies that were in
place in the 1970s and 1980s had the effect of creating some
communities with no opportunities for jobs and income, encourag-
ing increased drug use during this time period.24
Drug use has not always been viewed as a crisis. America's
drug history illustrates that there have been periods of tolerance
followed by periods of intolerance. Since the 1970s, however, pub-
lic tolerance of drug use has declined.25 For example, while the
1930s saw a fight against marijuana, the 1940s ignored the drug
problem; then in the 1950s, heroin increased in visibility, becom-
ing the most feared drug throughout the 1960s; and "by the close
of the 1960s, all hallucinogenic drugs had been placed under
strict legal control."26 In the mid-1970s, it seemed that heroin use
was declining, and public interest in drug policy correspondingly
decreased.27 Most recently, however, public interest in drug abuse
has again intensified and has entered a new period of intolerance
spurred by the Reagan Administration's "War on Drugs."2" As
some of the effects of cocaine became more well known, there was
a growing sense of intolerance of the drug.
21. See id. at 113.
22. Id. at 116.
23. Id. at 119-20.
24. See id. at 142; see also id. at 146 (i[Slocial and economic deprivation and a sense of
exclusion from the 'good life' breed drug abuse; but we have consciously chosen policies
that have spread and deepened poverty and widened the gap between the deprived and
the affluent.").
25. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. Cin. LEGAL F. 25, 37
(1994).
26. INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 23, 28, 31.
27. See BOYUM & REUTER, supra note 18, at 6.
28. See id. at 7.
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B. Crack and Powder-The Cocaine Epidemic
1. Cocaine Generally
Cocaine is derived from coca leaves found in the Andes Moun-
tains in South America. 29 The first form of cocaine use, now
nearly four thousand years old, was chewing coca leaves.3 ° Coca
was not considered a dangerous drug by any means. In fact, "[t]he
Incas regard coca as a gift from the gods intended to improve hu-
man life. Coca leaves are sacred .... They equate dedication to
coca chewing to spirituality and higher pursuits."3' The potency of
the coca leaves used by South American Indians, though, is much
lower than the potency of the drug used in America today.32
Reports indicated that cocaine was introduced to Europe as
early as the sixteenth century.33 A German chemist was able to
isolate cocaine from coca by 1860, and thus began the interest in
the pure alkaloid rather than the plant.34 Cocaine was used in the
nineteenth century largely for medicinal purposes-as a remedy
for illnesses and as an anesthetic.3 Coca wines and elixirs were
another popular mode of cocaine use in the late 1800s.36 These
liquids, though, were still not as potent as the drug that is used
29. William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentenc-
ing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (1996) (stating that the two species of plants that
yield enough of the cocaine alkaloid to "justify mass cultivation" are found mainly in Peru,
Bolivia and Columbia).
30. See id. (explaining the process of mixing lime with the leaves that South American
Indians would use to make chewing the leaves more enjoyable).
31. Id. at 1238-39; see also INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 6 ("[C]hewing coca leaves for
their mild stimulant effect had been a part of Andean culture for perhaps a thousand
years.").
Even today, chewing coca leaves is looked upon as beneficial: "Bolivia's new foreign
minister, David Choquehuanca, said the 'sacred leaf is so nutritious it should be on school
menus . . . . [a] spokesman for Peruvian presidential candidate Ollanta Humala said
ground coca leaf could be baked into schoolchildren's bread. In Venezuela, President Hugo
Chavez also embraced the idea of coca bread. 'Coca isn't the same as cocaine,' Chavez said.
'Coca is tremendously nutritional.'" Frank Bajak, Coca Eradication Way Down Under
Morales, at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060330/apon-re_laam-ca/boliviacoca-flourish
es (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
32. Spade, supra note 29, at 1239 (citing the potency of the leaves as being only one
percent of the potency of the drug used today).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1240. But see INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 7 (stating that there is contra-
diction regarding who first isolated cocaine and when).
35. See Spade, supra note 29 at 1240; see also INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing
the use of cocaine on Bavarian soldiers due to its ability to suppress fatigue).
36. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1240.
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today; the amount present in wine, for example, was similar to
the amount ingested by the coca leaf chewers.37 Coca drinks-
including Coca-Cola-were advertised as "invigorating Bever-
age[s] ... a valuable Brain Tonic, and a cure for all nervous affec-
tions." 3
When the availability of cocaine became more widespread, the
use of coca declined; however, a respective increase in medical
and nonmedical abuses occurred due to the higher potency of the
drug.3 9 Intranasal, injection, and inhalant methods of administra-
tion likewise increased. 40 During this time, cocaine was used for
multiple purposes, administered in varying ways, and used more
frequently. Cocaine also gained a certain amount of credibility.
Sigmund Freud, for example, referred to cocaine as a "magical
drug,"4' published an essay about its benefits, and encouraged
friends to use the drug until the late 1880s when reports were
published about compulsive use and side effects." Despite the
negative reports, the medical industry in the United States pro-
moted the drug as a home remedy to cure alcoholism, venereal
disease, and addiction to other medicines.4 Cocaine has also been
advertised with respect to sexual enhancement due to its reputa-
tion as an aphrodisiac." This use, though, has considerable dan-
gers.45
As the harmful effects of cocaine became more well-known,
public perception of the drug changed. 46 Legislative efforts to curb
cocaine abuse in the United States began in 1914 with the Harri-
37. See id.
38. INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 8 (reproducing an advertisement for Coca-Cola Syrup
and Extract).
39. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1241.
40. See id.
41. INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 7.
42. See id.; see also Spade, supra note 29, at 1242 (describing the first documented
addict who "became so addicted to the drug that, on one occasion, she pried loose one of
her gold teeth with a pair of scissors, and, with blood streaming down her face and drench-
ing her clothes, pawned the tooth for eighty cents in order to buy her daily dose").
43. INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 8-9.
44. See id. at 78, 80 ("A sprinkle of cocaine on the clitoris or just below the head of the
penis will anesthetize the tissues and retard a sexual climax ... with persistent stimula-
tion, the drug will ultimately promote an explosive orgasm."); Spade, supra note 29, at
1241 ("By 1894, cocaine was being used topically on the penis as well as rectally and vagi-
nally. It was believed to cause sexual arousal and to improve sexual performance.").
45. See INCIARDI, supra note 12, at 81 (explaining that the drug can either dry out the
urethral membranes or absorb so quickly that an overdose may occur).
46. Spade, supra note 29, at 1242.
1166 [Vol. 40:1161
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
son Narcotic Drug Act,47 and between 1930 and 1960 recreational
use was at an all-time low.48 Cocaine abuse rebounded in the
1960s, though, and crack cocaine was first manufactured in the
United States in the early 1970s.49 By the early 1980s, "crack use
had exploded,"" and the United States was in the midst of the
crack cocaine epidemic.5
2. Crack and Powder Compared
Although this comment focuses primarily on powder and crack,
simply because those are the forms governed by the 100:1 penalty
structure, it will also provide a brief analysis of how the different
forms are made. Based on chemical substance, pharmacology, and
distribution, crack and powder are not substantially different
drugs.52 From its initial form in the coca leaf,53 cocaine can take
many different forms: coca paste, cocaine hydrochloride (powder),
freebase cocaine, and cocaine base (crack). 4 Coca paste is an in-
termediary product used largely in South America.55 Cocaine
powder is made by treating coca paste with hydrochloric acid and
a solvent; it is generally sniffed, but can also be injected.56 Free-
base cocaine is made by treating the hydrochloride with an alkali
and can be smoked. Crack is provided to the consumer in a
ready-to-use format; it is made by dissolving the powder in warm
water and adding an alkali." Thus, pharmacologically, the forms
of cocaine differ only in the amount in which they are manufac-
tured.
47. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785.
48. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1243.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1243-44 (describing the epidemic as a "broad-based phenomenon that
simultaneously arose in several cities and was driven by drug dealers of different nation-
alities, races and ethnic groups").
52. See Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Co-
caine Laws? 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121, 149 (1994).
53. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1256 (stating that "[aill forms of cocaine are derived
from the coca leaf").
54. See id. at 1257-58.
55. See id. at 1257. "Smoking coca paste produces an intense euphoria, but is also
highly damaging." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1258.
58. Id.; see also CURRIE, supra note 12, at 335 (comparing the freebasing process to
crack: "Crack is produced through a far simpler, less dangerous, and less costly process,
which helps account for its appeal.").
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The general effects of cocaine use are the same whether the
drug is smoked, snorted, or injected. 9 The various methods of
use, however, have differences in the onset, intensity and dura-
tion of the physiological and psychotropic effects. 61 Physiologi-
cally, cocaine produces alertness and increases energy, motor ac-
tivity, heart rate, and blood pressure.6' The most rapid increases
are produced by the most efficient methods of absorption-
inhaling crack and injecting powder. 62 The psychotropic effects of
cocaine include "a sense of euphoria, decreased anxiety and social
inhibitions, and heightened sexuality."63 As with the physiological
effects, the faster the cocaine reaches the brain, the more intense
these effects are perceived-again, inhaling crack and injecting
powder are the most efficient.'
Heavy cocaine use produces "a definite 'abstinence syndrome,"'
including a high followed by a "crash" that is associated with feel-
ings of depression, agitation, fatigue, and anxiety.65 This phase
may also be followed by a withdrawal phase.66 Feelings of addic-
tion and psychological dependence are often stronger for crack
users than powder users.6 The drug has a reinforcing effect that
forces the user back to the drug.68 The feelings of anxiety and de-
pression that a user may experience will be stronger for the
methods that deliver the cocaine most rapidly to the brain since
they provide the highest levels of psychotropic effects.69
Crack also differs from powder in its accessibility. Crack comes
in smaller, more affordable forms that are ready to use, in addi-
59. See Lowney, supra note 52, at 150.
60. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1259.
61. See id. (explaining the effects of cocaine on the central nervous system and the
cardiovascular system).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1260 (discussing why cocaine causes these effects).
64. See id.
65. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 334 (explaining the effects of frequent cocaine use-
physically and psychologically).
66. Id.
67. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1261-62.
68. See id. at 1262 (describing the reinforcing effect as one causing the user to seek
the high again, but since subsequent highs are less intense, it causes a sense of unhappi-
ness that reinforces the desire to use the drug again).
69. Id. at 1261-62; see also CURRIE, supra note 12, at 335 ("[Clrack's effects are even
more short-lived than those of powder cocaine, as well as more intense [so] the urge to-
ward repeated use is particularly powerful....").
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tion to producing a more intense high.70 Crack, then, made co-
caine available to a wider variety of markets that now included
the poor and the young.71 Because of the ease with which crack
can be found, it has done the most damage to low-income areas.72
Crack markets bring with them societal harms-including crack
houses, gang violence, and the recruitment of children to distrib-
ute the drug.73 Researchers have also suggested that crack is
found in a "'subculture of violence,"' and that while crack use is
not the cause of violence, crack use and violence are highly corre-
lated.74
Due to these characteristics, it has been said that crack is the
most dangerous form of cocaine.75 The question that arises is
whether the differences between crack and powder are substan-
tial enough to justify a 100:1 penalty ratio.
C. The Creation of the 100:1 Ratio
Anti-drug legislation surrounding cocaine began in 1914 with
the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act.76 The Harrison Act, which was
passed using racial politics, prohibited the non-medical use of co-
caine.77 The cocaine supply was reduced after this Act was
passed, and cocaine did not re-emerge as a problem until the
1960s.7" Following the re-emergence of the problem, the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970"9 ("the
Act of 1970") was passed and eliminated mandatory minimums.8 0
70. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1263.
71. Id. (analyzing the crack market).
72. See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 80-81 ("[C]rack has struck hardest at the poorest of
the poor .... Crack sales and use were not dispersed evenly ... but were concentrated
almost exclusively in 'isolated pockets of the community."').
73. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1263-65.
74. CURRIE, supra note 12, at 174.
75. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1266 (citing four reasons: crack is the most compel-
ling type of cocaine addiction; the crack trade is difficult for law enforcement agencies to
break up; crack addiction preys on the young and the poor; and crack leads to "paranoid,
disorganized thinking"). But see Lowney, supra note 52, at 151 ("Although crack and co-
caine produce some different effects, including intensity of the high and plasma levels,
there is no pharmacological evidence indicating that crack is more dangerous than powder
cocaine.").
76. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785.
77. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1246 (discussing the origins of the Harrison Act).
78. Id. at 1247.
79. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
80. Spade, supra note 29, at 1247.
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Mandatory minimums were brought back to life in the 1980s as
part of the War on Drugs.81 More specifics on sentencing, and sen-
tencing reforms will be discussed in Part III.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198682 ("the Act of 1986") is pri-
marily responsible for the current sentencing structure for co-
caine. Crack had "come to symbolize .. .the entire problem of
illicit narcotics in America." 4 Members of Congress were con-
cerned that crack opened the market up to the poor and juveniles,
and that it might spread outward from the inner city confines.8 5
The Act of 1986 was expedited through Congress based on a feel-
ing that the nation was "under siege from crack." 6 It, therefore,
did not get the amount of discussion that legislation under nor-
mal circumstances generally receives.8 ' Beyond showing that dif-
ferent ratios were considered, the legislative history does not ex-
plain why Congress rejected or accepted any one ratio in
particular.8
The Act of 1986, then, is "the major legislative response to the
dramatic changes during the 1980s in public attitudes toward
drug abuse." 9 It established "stiff' mandatory minimums for nar-
cotics trafficking, most of which were set to quantities of the drug
that were indicative of large-scale offenders.9 ° Interestingly, the
81. See id. at 1249.
82. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
83. Elizabeth Tison, Comment, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine Of-
fenses: The 100-to-1 Ratio Is Not as "Cracked" Up As Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413,
416 (2002).
84. Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1292.
85. See id. at 1295 (discussing the cocaine related deaths that occurred in late June of
1986; these two deaths of well-known athletes built on the fear that crack was not just a
threat for minority communities, but for everyone).
86. Spade, supra note 29, at 1251.
87. See id. at 1253. The hearing on the 100:1 ratio lasted less than four hours, and the
passing of the legislation in the "frenzied panicked atmosphere" has been compared to a
poker game. A former Judiciary Committee staff member described the environment in
the following way: "I'll see your five years and I'll raise you five years. It was the crassest
political poker game." Id. at 1255.
88. See id. at 1252. The history shows that the legislators seemed to believe that crack
was more addictive, causes crime, has more dangerous physiological effects, that the
young are particularly prone to use it, and that the low cost would lead to more wide-
spread use. Id.; see also 1995 REPORT, supra note 10, at 185 (listing the reasons that Con-
gress considered crack more dangerous than powder).
89. Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1286.
90. See id. at 1286-87 (discussing that Congress wanted to punish kingpins most
heavily, and so provided a ten-year mandatory minimum for quantities believed to be as-
sociated with major traffickers, and five-year minimums for those quantities thought to be
1170 [Vol. 40:1161
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threshold for crack was set by simply dividing the threshold for
powder by 100, thus establishing the 100:1 ratio.91 The main jus-
tifications for this ratio were that crack is associated with sys-
temic crime, that it is more widely available to the young and the
poor, and that it produces more intense physiological and psycho-
tropic effects.92 One year later, the Sentencing Commission intro-
duced Sentencing Guidelines that mirror the 100:1 ratio.93 In
1988, Congress created a mandatory minimum penalty for simple
possession of crack, again distinguishing the two forms of co-
caine.94
D. Criticisms and Responses
The 100:1 ratio has been criticized for a number of reasons,95
and the Sentencing Commission itself has attempted to encour-
age Congress to change it on three separate occasions. 96 It is per-
haps this element of federal sentencing that has received the
most analysis over the past twenty years.97 It is also an intensely
litigated element of federal sentencing, having been frequently
challenged in courts for a number of reasons.9" Judges have ex-
pressed disagreement with the ratio and looked for ways to avoid
its application,99 have refused to hear cases where they would
associated with middle-level dealers).
91. Id. at 1287. Thus, fifty grams instead of five thousand would carry a ten-year
mandatory minimum. See id.
92. See Tison, supra note 83, at 417 (citing the 1995 REPORT, supra note 10, at 118).
93. See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1287.
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000).
95. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
96. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 10, at 195-96; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 9 (1997), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/newcrack.pdf [hereinafter 1997 REPORT]; U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
104 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.htm [here-
inafter 2002 REPORT]. For further explanation on the reports, see infra Part II.D.2.
97. KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 8.
98. See, e.g., Cristian M. Stevens, Note, Criticism of Crack Cocaine Sentences Is Not
What It Is Cracked Up to Be: A Case of First Impression Within the Ongoing Crack vs. Co-
caine Debate, 62 Mo. L. REV. 869, 876-77 (1997) (citing cases challenging the ratio on
theories of selective prosecution, equal protection, due process, void for vagueness, cruel
and unusual punishment, and disparity not taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission); see also Andrew N. Sacher, Note, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Dis-
crimination on the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1149, 1156 (1997) (noting that
the ratio has been challenged in every circuit and citing cases from each circuit with a spe-
cific challenge).
99. See generally Sacher, supra note 98, at 1159 (discussing a letter written by
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have to apply it, and have even resigned.' 0 This section will first
address the major criticisms of the ratio and then discuss how the
Sentencing Commission and Congress have responded to these
criticisms.
1. Major Criticisms
The most prominent criticism of the ratio is that it has a dis-
criminatory impact.' 01 Other criticisms are that it fails to achieve
the goal of targeting the major traffickers; 0 2 that targeting street
dealers actually perpetuates the violence that Congress seemed
so concerned about; 10 3 and that crack is essentially the same drug
as powder.' 4
Before the full implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines,
people of different races received similar sentences. After imple-
mentation, differences among the races in sentencing became
more pronounced. 0 5 A number of reasons have been offered for
this impact: (1) crack is typically used in black communities; (2)
crack is usually dealt in the inner city; and (3) police may pay
more attention to crack dealing in those neighborhoods.0 6 Crack
is often used and dealt in inner-city communities, in part because
of a lack of access to legitimate employment.'0 ' With respect to
twenty-seven judges "expressly call[ing] for a reduction between the disparity in the pen-
alties for crack and cocaine"); Spade, supra note 29, at 1279-83.
100. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1281-82.
101. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 143 (1999) ("[N]o policy has contributed
more to the incarceration of African Americans than the 'war on drugs.'"); Sklansky, supra
note 9, at 1289 ("The particularly harsh federal penalties for trafficking in crack cocaine
thus have a particularly disproportionate impact on black defendants."); Spade, supra note
29, at 1266-71 (explaining the disparate impact that the ratio has on blacks). But see Ste-
vens, supra note 98, at 886 (stating that the evidence to show "that blacks are unfairly...
affected by the crack statute is scarce and inconclusive").
102. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 29, at 1271-73 (discussing the ways that the ratio fails
to target dangerous offenders).
103. See, e.g., Sacher, supra note 98, at 1180.
104. See, e.g., id. at 1189-90 (noting that the principal source should be targeted, since
"[cirack is no more than a tragic derivative of the much larger cocaine market").
105. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1266.
106. See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1289 (discussing these three reasons for the dispro-
portionate impact); KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 9 ("The 100-to-1 ratio has had a dis-
proportionate impact on defendants of color, primarily as the result of differential prac-
tices by law enforcement.").
107. See MAUER, supra note 101, at 166-67 ("For many, drug dealing was not a full-
time occupation but, rather, a means of earning extra income at times when their earnings
from legitimate employment were down.").
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the third reason for the discriminatory impact, inner-city crack
dealing takes place outside, where it is easier for police to ob-
serve, while in upper-class neighborhoods drug deals usually take
place behind closed doors. Therefore, it is easier for the police to
identify offenders in the inner-city neighborhoods.' This effect
has also been referred to as a "vicious circle," perpetuating the
problems that we see with the discriminatory impact of the 100:1
ratio.109
An additional criticism is that the 100:1 ratio's distinction be-
tween crack and powder does not catch the kingpins that Con-
gress attempted to target throughout the rest of the Act of
1986." ° Instead, it targets low-level dealers, both in the quantity
of the drug necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum, and
also because it is the low-level dealers that generally convert the
powder received from high-level dealers into crack."' In fact, the
ratio can, in some situations, have the opposite effect and actually
target the low-level dealers, sentencing the small dealers who buy
powder and convert it into crack to longer terms than the whole-
sale dealer would receive. 112
Another criticism of the 100:1 ratio is that it does not ade-
quately take into account the fact that crack cocaine and powder
cocaine are basically the same drug. Without powder, there would
be no crack because "[cirack is not cultivated or imported inde-
pendently from cocaine."" 3 As discussed above, crack is formed by
108. See MAUER, supra note 101, at 148; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
COLIJM. L. REV. 1795, 1799 (1998). According to Professor Stuntz, "participants in street
markets are more easily caught, making them better targets for police attention than their
counterparts in upperclass markets." Id. at 1816. Furthermore, "[1]ooking in poor
neighborhoods tends to be both successful and cheap." Id. at 1820.
109. See Stuntz, supra note 108, at 1832. Stuntz explains that it becomes a vicious cir-
cle when the system targets street markets (because of the social harm and because it is
easier). The targeting undermines the normative power of the drug laws in those
neighborhoods (often predominantly black communities) and the system then responds by
raising the frequency and level of punishment. This increases the proportion of black men
in prison, undermining the normative power even more. Id.
110. See, e.g., Sacher, supra note 98, at 1189 ("Few drug kingpins are ever prose-
cuted."); Spade, supra note 29, at 1272 ("[I]f the purpose of the 100:1 ratio is to exact the
harshest punishment on 'serious' or 'major' drug traffickers ... statistics show that it is
not accomplishing its purpose.").
111. See Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1288 ("Defendants caught trafficking in crack thus
are almost always the street-level retailers of the cocaine trade, not the wholesalers.").
112. See Spade, supra note 29, at 1273 (providing an example of a case where the 100:1
ratio had the ironic effect of sentencing the retail crack dealer to a longer term than the
wholesale powder distributor who supplied the powder).
113. Sacher, supra note 98, at 1189; see id. at 1190 (explaining that drug laws should
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dissolving powder and treating it with an alkali such as baking
soda.114 "Crack and cocaine powder are the same drug, prepared
and packaged differently. The same is true of liquor and beer."
115
While the two may have some different effects and crack may give
rise to more dangers, the fact remains that they are essentially
the same drug.
116
Based largely on the above arguments and criticisms, the Sen-
tencing Commission has made three separate attempts to change
the ratio.
2. Sentencing Commission Responses
In February of 1995, the Sentencing Commission issued an ex-
tensive report about crack and powder sentencing, stating that
"those factors Congress considered in distinguishing crack from
powder cocaine lead[] to mixed conclusions and few clear an-
swers,"1 7 and ultimately recommended against a 100:1 ratio."'
The Sentencing Commission was not at that point ready to rec-
ommend another specific ratio, but said that it would focus on a
model that provided sentencing enhancements for those defen-
dants that engage in the most dangerous behavior." 9
Three months later, the Sentencing Commission presented
twelve amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to Congress.12
Amendment Five proposed that the distinction be eliminated, and
that crack and powder cocaine be treated equally.' 2 ' Congress re-
jected the Sentencing Commission's amendment, however, and
reflect the practical reality that crack and powder are just two forms of the same drug).
114. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
115. Stuntz, supra note 108, at 1806.
116. See Sacher, supra note 98, at 1176 (citing a district court decision finding cocaine
and crack to be synonymous, and any distinction to be "scientifically meaningless'"). But
see Stevens, supra note 98, at 887 (arguing that the same drug argument ignores the
"'real-world differences'").
117. 1995 REPORT, supra note 10, at 195.
118. See id. at 198.
119. See id. ("[T]he Commission will focus on a model that maximizes the development
of offense- and offender-specific guideline enhancements addressing as many of the dis-
crete, substantial harms associated with crack offenses as reasonably can be handled in a
guideline system."). Enhancements would better fulfill the goal at targetting dangerous
kingpins.
120. See Tison, supra note 83, at 424 (citing the twelve amendments proposed at 60
Fed. Reg. 25,074 (1995)).
121. Id.
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directed them to make further recommendations. 122 Even though
Congress rejected Amendment Five and the recommendations
made in the Sentencing Commission's 1995 report, "it recognized
that momentum for change had to be maintained because of the
injustice resulting from application of the 100-to-1 ratio."123
The Sentencing Commission followed up in 1997, reiterating
that they were unanimous in their original findings "that, al-
though research and public policy may support somewhat higher
penalties for crack than for powder cocaine, a 100-to-1 quantity
ratio cannot be justified. The Commission is firmly and unani-
mously in agreement that the current penalty differential for fed-
eral powder and crack cocaine cases should be reduced .... "124
The Commission again recognized that while crack and powder
are both dangerous, crack is more dangerous, and that should be
reflected in the sentencing structure. 2 ' The Commission recom-
mended reducing the quantity trigger-level for powder cocaine
from 500 grams to somewhere within the range of 125 to 375
grams, and reducing the level for crack to a number within the
range of 25 to 75.126 Also in 1997, the Clinton Administration pub-
licly proposed reducing the ratio.1
27
In December 2001, the Drug Sentencing Reform Act was pro-
posed, which would have reduced the disparity to 20:1.12 In May
2002, the Sentencing Commission came out with another report
again concluding that the ratio should be reduced. 29 The 2002 re-
port recognized that some of the conclusions reached in 1986 to
justify the ratio may no longer be accurate. 30 Recommending a
20:1 ratio,131 the Sentencing Commission made clear that it
122. Id. at 425. The recommendations were to recognize that a sentence for crack
should exceed the sentence imposed for a similar quantity of powder, that major traffick-
ers should receive longer sentences, and that a powder trafficker should be sentenced as
though he were a crack dealer if he knew that the substance would be converted into
crack. Id.
123. Tison, supra note 83, at 426.
124. 1997 REPORT, supra note 96, at 2.
125. See id. at 4.
126. See id. at 9.
127. See Tison, supra note 83, at 427. The administration effectively called for a ratio of
10:1, but no bill was ever introduced. Id at 427-28.
128. KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 10 (citing S. 1874, 107th Cong. (2001)).
129. See generally 2002 REPORT, supra note 96, at 90-112 (discussing the report's find-
ings, evaluating the current penalty structure, and recommending changes).
130. See id. at 91.
131. See id. at 107.
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"firmly and unanimously" believed the current ratio to be unjusti-
fied,132 while recognizing that there are differences in the harms
and dangers which should be reflected in the penalty structure. 
133
Reviewing the criticisms of the ratio, it recommended a three-
pronged approach for revising the sentencing policy, which would
(1) increase the threshold quantity to trigger a five-year manda-
tory minimum for crack offenses to at least twenty-five grams; (2)
provide for sentencing enhancements; and (3) maintain the man-
datory minimum thresholds for powder at their current levels.'
Still, the original structure remains in place.
III. SENTENCING BACKGROUND
Despite the unsuccessful challenges in court, the unnoticed
criticisms by judges, and the ignored Sentencing Commission Re-
ports, there may still be hope for the critics of the ratio in light of
the recent Supreme Court decision in Booker.135 First, though, a
brief background on the history of sentencing leading up to the
Sentencing Guidelines and their ensuing breakdown is useful.
A. Pre-Guideline Sentencing
The process of sentencing has changed over time, varying be-
tween a discretionary process where judges have substantial lee-
way in tailoring a particular sentence for an individual and a de-
terminate process where decision-making is more mechanical. At
the outset, a general recognition of the reasons why we punish is
helpful, because different methods of punishment tend to accom-
plish different goals.136 Some of the justifications for punishment
are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and res-
toration. 137 Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("the
132. Id. at 91.
133. See id. at 92.
134. Id. at 104 (describing the three-pronged approach).
135. See KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 6 ("The decision in Booker changed these me-
chanics of sentencing. Judges are now instructed to consider a host of relevant conduct
factors.").
136. See CASSIA C. SPOHN, How Do JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 6 (2002).
137. Id. at 6-7 (discussing the goals underlying each of these justifications).
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SRA")," 8 rehabilitation was the primary goal, and judges acted
under a system of indeterminate sentencing 39 where they consid-
ered many different factors to tailor a sentence to fit an individ-
ual offender.14 °
Starting as early as 1933,141 lawmakers began to notice dispari-
ties resulting from the discretion afforded judges; their concerns
escalated into a reform movement in the 1970s."' Criticisms
came from advocates of prisoners' rights, the psychiatric commu-
nity, conservatives and liberals.' It was hoped that the reforms
would eliminate disparities and discretion in sentencing'44 so that
factors like race, gender, and class would no longer play a role in
sentencing decisions.' Judge Marvin Frankel from New York
was a key player in the sentencing reform movement; he believed
that the discretion afforded to judges led to "'lawlessness.'' 46 He
called for the formation of a sentencing commission that would
create solid rules that judges would have to follow. 14 7
B. The Guidelines
The bill including the SRA was signed into law on October 12,
1984, with broad, bipartisan support.' 48 Three objectives of the
138. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000)).
139. Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2000).
140. See SPOHN, supra note 136, at 118 (stating that "judges [could] consider the harm
done by the crime, the blameworthiness and culpability of the offender, and the offender's
potential for reform and rehabilitation").
141. Froyd, supra note 139, at 1473.
142. See SPOHN, supra note 136, at 219 ("Concerns about disparity, discrimination, and
unfairness in sentencing led to a 'remarkable burst of reform' that began in the mid-1970s
.... " (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990, at 112 (1993))).
143. See KATE STITH & JoS A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: FEDERAL GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 30-31, 39 (1998).
144. See SPOHN, supra note 136, at 222.
145. See Froyd, supra note 139, at 1473.
146. SPOHN, supra note 136, at 223. Frankel believed that judges were not trained to
sentence appropriately and that they were given too much discretion, leading to arbitrari-
ness and disparity. Id.; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 35-37 (referring to
Frankel's criticisms of judicial sentencing discretion as the most influential, and discuss-
ing his contributions to the sentencing reform debate).
147. SPOHN, supra note 136, at 223. These reform suggestions resulted in the Sentenc-
ing Commission discussed supra in Part II.D.2.
148. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 48.
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SRA were to provide certainty and honesty, uniformity, and pro-
portionality in sentencing. 149 In order to achieve these goals, Con-
gress decided to impose a determinate sentencing system and es-
tablished the United States Sentencing Commission to create
that system. 150 The Sentencing Commission established a policy it
hoped would ensure parity among similar offenders by placing
the emphasis on the offense instead of the offender.' 5 ' In order to
do this, it came up with a set of guidelines that went into effect in
1987.152
The Sentencing Guidelines are based on the seriousness of the
offense and the offender's prior record.'53 Using a sentencing table
with offense levels (1-43) vertically and criminal history catego-
ries (I-VI) horizontally, a judge determines the offense level and
the criminal history category, follows the grid, and is given a
range within which the defendant must be sentenced. 1 4 Follow-
ing the new system of the Sentencing Guidelines, a judge no
longer had the discretion to determine which factors were most
relevant and then weigh all of the relevant circumstances; the
new process was "substantially more mechanical."'55 The process
of sentencing under the Sentencing Guidelines has drawn criti-
cism with opponents saying that "we cease to judge at all. We
process individuals according to a variety of purportedly objective
criteria."'56
In addition to reducing disparities through the SRA, in the
1980s, Congress also established a number of mandatory mini-
149. See Froyd, supra note 139, at 1476.
150. See id. at 1476-77.
151. See id. at 1478.
152. See SPOHN, supra note 136, at 232.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., id. at 232-33 (reproducing the federal sentencing grid). For an example
of how the Sentencing Guidelines work in practice, see generally, Jonathan Chiu, Com-
ment, United States v. Booker: The Demise of Mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Return of Indeterminate Sentencing, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311, 1317-18 (2005).
155. SPOHN, supra note 136, at 236 (explaining that a judge can only depart from the
guideline range if there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that justify such a
departure); see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 72 (highlighting that departures,
especially downward departures, are discouraged); see also id. at 30 (mentioning some
benefits of discretionary sentencing: "[d]iscretionary sentencing provided some opportu-
nity.., to correct or adjust any untoward consequences of the closed, formal rules govern-
ing the previous stages of the process").
156. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 82.
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mum sentences for drug offenses." 7 These penalties also had ret-
ribution as a primary goal-Congress was looking for predictable
and severe punishments.'58 The Sentencing Guidelines, like man-
datory minimum statutes, have been criticized for their inflexibil-
ity--essentially turning a judge into a "sentencing machine[ ]."'
It should be noted, however, that the Sentencing Guidelines build
on mandatory minimums, and thus, often require more than the
mandatory minimum.16 °
The issue of whether or not the Sentencing Guidelines have ful-
filled the goal of reducing disparities in sentencing has been de-
bated, and conclusions, "to put the most positive spin on it, [are]
'mixed.""61 Additionally, reviewers have found that sentencing re-
forms have not eliminated unwarranted racial disparities.'62 Re-
gardless of the criticisms regarding the lack of discretion, the Su-
preme Court held the Sentencing Guidelines to be constitutional
in 1989 in Mistretta v. United States.'6'
C. The Breakdown of the Mandatory Guidelines
The Mistretta decision, though, was not the end of constitu-
tional challenges to the Sentencing Guidelines.'64 Three cases
were decided by the Supreme Court that eventually led to the
demise of mandatory sentencing under the Sentencing Guide-
lines: Apprendi v. New Jersey,165 Blakely v. Washington,166 and fi-
157. See Froyd, supra note 139, at 1485-86.
158. See id. at 1488. During the 1980s, there was growing public concern about crime;
therefore, the mandatory minimum penalties and the Sentencing Reform Act were consis-
tent with a "get tough" attitude. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 43.
159. SPOHN, supra note 136, at 241. The Sentencing Guidelines, when promulgated,
incorporated the same 100:1 ratio for cocaine offenses that is seen in the mandatory mini-
mums. See supra Part II.C.
160. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 143, at 125. As will be seen in Part III, infra,
now that the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, judges have departed from
the 100:1 ratio in the Guidelines, imposing lesser sentences, but still abiding by the man-
datory minimum.
161. SPOHN, supra note 136, at 290.
162. See id. at 293; see also supra Part II.D (discussing the racially disparate impact of
cocaine sentencing under the guidelines).
163. 488 U.S. 361,412 (1989).
164. See generally Chiu, supra note 154, at 1320-41 (noting that the Supreme Court
reheard the issue multiple times following its holding in Mistretta).
165. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
166. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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nally, United States v. Booker.167 Booker will be discussed sepa-
rately, as it is the decision that will directly affect the cocaine
sentencing debate.
While Apprendi did not deal with the Sentencing Guidelines,
its rule, if read broadly, threatened the Guidelines' validity.16
The case dealt with two New Jersey criminal law statutes. One of
the statutes imposed a sentencing range of five to ten years and
the second allowed the trial judge to double the sentence if, by a
preponderance of the evidence, he determined that there was a
biased purpose.169 The trial judge used the second statute and de-
termined that Apprendi acted with racial bias, sentencing him to
twelve years.170 The Supreme Court held that the sentence should
be vacated because aside from a prior conviction, "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be... proved beyond a reasonable doubt [to the
jury]."' 7 ' Though the Court, in a footnote, reserved judgment on
the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines for another
day,172 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her dissent, cautioned
that Apprendi would lead to the invalidation of the Sentencing
Guidelines.'73 In the short-term, Apprendi did not have the effect
feared by Justice O'Connor, but rather merely shifted more fact-
finding authority to the jury.'74
Blakely, however, "[dashed a]ny hope that the Sentencing
Guidelines would survive."175 Blakely, while still not concerning
the Sentencing Guidelines directly, came closer with its consid-
eration of the Washington Sentencing Reform Act.'76 The trial
judge did not follow the State's recommendation of a presumptive
sentence, and instead imposed an "exceptional" sentence of ninety
167. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
168. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sen-
tencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 704-06 (2005).
169. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.
170. Id. at 471.
171. Id. at 490.
172. See id. at 497 n.21.
173. See id. at 550-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. See Klein, supra note 168, at 706 ("[Tlhe Apprendi decision significantly affected
state and federal criminal law practice in shifting fact-finding authority from judge to
jury.").
175. Id. at 709.
176. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004).
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months.177 In imposing this sentence, the trial judge relied on a
statutorily enumerated ground, but Blakely argued that after
Apprendi, the aggravating fact should have been submitted to the
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 ' Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing for the majority, interpreted "statutory maximum"
for Apprendi purposes, holding that it is "the maximum sentence
a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."'79 When the court
again failed to address the effect of its decision on the Sentencing
Guidelines, Justice O'Connor expressed similar concerns to those
conveyed in her dissent in Apprendi, fearing that the Sentencing
Guidelines were in jeopardy.' Following this decision, the cir-
cuits split as to how to apply Blakely to the Sentencing Guide-
lines. 1
8 1
D. United States v. Booker
The Supreme Court consolidated two appeals-those of Booker
and Fanfan-to decide the question of whether Apprendi and
Blakely applied to the Sentencing Guidelines.8 2 In both cases, the
trial judge made additional findings by a preponderance of the
evidence. In Booker, the judge applied the enhancements (though
the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision);"8 3 in Fanfan, the dis-
trict court did not."' 4 In a two-majority decision, the first majority
concluded that the enhancement factors violated the Sixth
Amendment. 85 In a separate opinion, authored by Justice Breyer,
the majority found the appropriate remedy was to make the Sen-
tencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.
8 6
177. Id. at 300.
178. See id. at 300-01.
179. Id. at 303.
180. See id. at 325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This suggests that the hard constraints
found throughout chapters 2 and 3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which require an
increase in the sentencing range upon specified factual findings, will meet the same
fate.").
181. See Klein, supra note 168, at 712.
182. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229 (2005).
183. Id. at 227-28.
184. Id. at 228-29.
185. Id. at 245. Justice Stevens wrote the first 5-4 majority decision reaffirming the
holding in Apprendi.
186. Id. at 245 ("So modified, the Federal Sentencing Act ... makes the Guidelines ef-
fectively advisory.").
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In the first majority, Justice John Paul Stevens found the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to be indistinguishable from the scheme in
Blakely, and because the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory,
they required judges to increase sentences based upon their own
fact-finding." 7 As explained in Apprendi and Blakely, this type of
fact-finding must be done by the jury and must be found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Justice Breyer determined that, by severing
the provision making the Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, the
Court could preserve them without violating the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.' The Court also had to sever the pro-
vision relating to the appellate process, because the previous
standard of review was that sentences should be in conformity
with the Sentencing Guidelines; now, sentences will be reviewed
for "reasonableness."1 9
IV. THE EFFECT OF BOOKER ON THE CRACK/POWDER DEBATE
Judges and scholars now are left to wonder what effect Booker
will have on the crack/powder debate. Will the decision leave
room for judges to sentence crack defendants to a term lower than
what the 100:1 ratio would require? If so, will the results add
enough fuel to the fire that has been burning to finally lead Con-
gress to change the ratio, and adopt the Sentencing Commission's
recent recommendation of 20:1? The answer to the latter question
remains to be seen.'9 ° While the answer to the former question is
still developing, based on what has transpired in federal courts in
the past year, the preliminary answer is in the affirmative.
Booker "significantly affected" the "dynamics of crack cocaine
sentencing."'' After ten years, the repeated efforts to eliminate
the disparity have a new path. 9 2 Now, judges who previously
187. Id. at 234-35.
188. See Klein, supra note 168, at 714 (noting that in the process, judicial discretion in
sentencing matters was also greatly expanded).
189. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-62.
190. Many critics have made clear that this is exactly what they think should happen.
See, e.g., KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 3 ("Congress should review the recommenda-
tions of the Sentencing Commission ... and reconsider proposals to amend the law.").
191. KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 1.
192. See Pamela A. MacLean, Sentencing, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Oct. 6, 2005, at
10 (explaining that past efforts have "foundered on the rocky shoals of politics," but that
now, "emboldened by a newfound independence," some judges "have begun to quietly roll
back potential crack sentences").
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could do no more than voice their complaints about imposing the
ratio can take action.193 Even beyond that, some commentators
hope that "Congress will rectify the problem of the disparate
mandatory minimums . . . and also will approve ameliorative
changes to the Sentencing Guidelines." 194 Courts are now trying
to sentence below the advisory guideline range for crack defen-
dants. As one judge commented, "[t]he growing sentiment in the
district courts is clear."
195
The pressure to change the Sentencing Guidelines is coming
not only from the court system. The Justice Roundtable has re-
quested that the Inter-American Commission hold a hearing to
examine the discriminatory impact of mandatory minimum sen-
tencing, citing the distinction between crack and powder as the
"most flagrant example." 96 The American Bar Association
("ABA") has also urged the Commission to hold a hearing to ex-
amine the discriminatory impact of mandatory minimums, stat-
ing that it agrees with the Justice Roundtable about the effect of
the crack/powder distinction.'97 Following these requests, the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights decided to hold a
hearing on March 3, 2006.198
193. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 3, ("United States district courts are no longer
bound to impose the extraordinarily harsh Guideline sentences on sellers of crack co-
caine."). But see, Lee Hammel, Crack vs. Cocaine: Caught between a rock and a powder,
WORCHESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Feb. 19, 2006, at Al (stating that "not even the U.S.
Supreme Court's ... decision [in Booker] ... has been able to protect crack cocaine defen-
dants from lengthy incarceration").
194. Id.; KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 10 ("The past two decades have witnessed a
growing chorus of interested parties demanding reform .... Booker changed the terrain of
federal sentencing ... open[ing] up room for reform within the federal system.").
195. United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307 (D.R.I. 2005) ("[T]he advisory
guideline range for crack cocaine based on the 100:1 ratio cannot withstand the scrutiny
imposed by sentencing courts when [sentencing goals] are applied."); see also Klein, supra
note 168, at 727-28 ("[Jludges, who had their hands tied until Booker, are now imposing
crack cocaine sentences below that formerly required by the Guidelines.").
196. See Letter from Justice Roundtable to Dr. Santiago Canton, Executive Secretary,
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.
drugpolicy.org/docUploads/LetterSantiagoCantonl220
0 5.pdf. One of the primary missions
of the Justice Roundtable is "to promote fairness and equality in the criminal justice sys-
tem" and its "ultimate goal is to build safe and healthy communities that respect the civil
and human rights of all." Id. at 1 n.1.
197. See Letter from Michael S. Pasano, Chair, American Bar Association, Criminal
Justice Section, to Dr. Santiago Canton, Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights 1 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.osipc.org/pub/doc-98/ABA%20
Criminal%20Justice%20Section%20Letter.pdf.
198. Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, The Inter-
118320061
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Judges can now fashion a sentence to more appropriately meet
the goals and true purposes of sentencing.199 Still, the courts are
not free to sentence as they like-they must follow certain rules
in sentencing defendants even after Booker. Courts must now
consider the Sentencing Guideline range along with sentencing
goals and factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). °° This section provides a
mandate that a court "impose a sentence 'sufficient, but not
greater than necessary,' to comply with the four purposes of sen-
tencing. . ". ." ' In addition to complying with this mandate, sen-
tencing courts must now consider, along with the Sentencing-
Guideline range, several other factors also set forth in § 3553(a):
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the appli-
cable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines ...
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion... ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.202
American Commission on Human Rights to Review Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in
the U.S. Justice System (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.osipc.org/printer-friendly.
php?docId=98&url=/news/article.php?docID=98.
199. See KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 2; see also id. at 8 ("[Jludges are increasingly
using its remedial prescription in their consideration of enhancements that go above the
mandatory minimum.").
200. See David L. McColgin & Brett G. Sweitzer, Grid & Bear It, 29 THE CHAMPION 50,
50 (2005).
201. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)). The four factors are retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
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An additional constraint is that even if, after consideration of
these factors, the court determines that it should impose a sen-
tence below the range, it cannot go below any statutorily imposed
mandatory minimum. 2 3 Along with these statutory factors, the
recommendations of the Sentencing Commission have "provided
valuable guidance in the crafting of a non-Guideline sentence."20 4
In crafting a sentence, judges must always determine the ap-
plicable Guideline range. Exactly how much weight should be
given to the Guideline range, however, has been debated. Most
evaluate the additional criteria "equally relative" to the Guide-
lines.205 A three-step process in sentencing a defendant after
Booker includes calculating the applicable guideline range, de-
termining whether any departures apply, and then determining
the appropriate sentence.0 6 Following this process, staying above
the mandatory minimum, and following the factors set out in §
3553(a), a number of district courts have still found ways to de-
part from the advisory Guideline range.0 7 Many of courts have
used the § 3553 factors and determined that the Guideline sen-
tences are disproportionate to meet the sentencing goals.208
Using these factors, many courts found leeway to depart from
the Sentencing Guideline range. For example, Judge Adelman in
the Eastern District of Wisconsin imposed sentences below the
range for crack defendants, citing the 100:1 disparity as one ra-
203. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 381 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
("[Alithough I must still impose any penalty mandated by statute, I have discretion to
modify the guideline portion of a sentence in order to produce a reasonable total sen-
tence."); United States v. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d 878, 884 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (explaining
that Booker allows consideration of the 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to follow guide-
lines when they exceed mandatory minimum); United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d
771, 781 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) ("Only Congress can correct the statutory problem, but after
Booker district courts need no longer blindly adhere to the 100:1 guideline ratio.").
204. KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 17; see also, United States v. Eura, No. 05-4437,
05-4533, 2006 WL 440099 at *7 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2006) (Michael, J., concurring) ("I write
separately to discuss the practical utility of the Sentencing Commission's reports ....
[T]hese reports can be useful to courts . ..
205. See, e.g., id. at 11.
206. See Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 772-73 ("Following Booker, a court will typically
follow a three-step sentencing process."). But see Eura, 2006 WL 440099 at *5 (using a two
step process to sentence after Booker-calculating the Guideline range and then consider
the range along with the § 3553(a) factors).
207. See KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 4-5 (providing a table of case outcomes de-
tailing the guideline range, the actual sentence, and the rationale provided by the court).
208. Id. at 13; see id. at 15 (explaining that courts are reluctant to use the Guideline
range when the sentences are disproportionate to offense).
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tionale in a few cases. °9 In analyzing the § 3553(a) factors listed
above, Judge Adelman grouped them into three categories: "the
nature of the offense, the history of the defendant, and the needs
of the public."210 Then, in considering the Sentencing Guidelines,
he determined that there is room to depart under subsections
(a)(2) and (a)(6).21'
Section 3553(a)(2) affords the court discretion to determine
whether the Sentencing Guideline range is greater than neces-
sary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. In light of the Sentenc-
ing Commission's finding that the 100:1 disparity is not war-
ranted, it is also within the court's discretion to sentence below
the guideline range.212 Section 3553(a)(6) permits the court to tai-
lor the sentence to avoid unwarranted disparity. 213 A court also
acts within its discretion in concluding that the Guidelines create
a racial disparity and a disparity between crack and powder de-
fendants. 214 Thus, Judge Adelman used these factors to fashion a
sentence believed to be more in accordance with the goals of sen-
tencing but that was below the Sentencing Guideline range nor-
mally used for the crack defendants.215
This logic has been followed in courts other than those in Wis-
consin. In New York, for example, judges of the Eastern District
and the Southern District sentenced outside the Sentencing
Guideline range in crack cases. Judge Sweet, in two sentencing
opinions from the Southern District-United States v. Castillo 216
and United States v. Stukes 217 -determined that "[u]se of [a 20:1
ratio] . . . will mitigate the disparity .... It will also further the
policy considerations . . . while still achieving the level of deter-
rence necessary to protect the public."211
209. See, e.g., United States v. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (using
the Sentencing Commission's suggestion of a 20:1 ratio as a guideline); Beamon, 373 F.
Supp. 2d at 886 (E.D. Wisc. 2005); Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82.
210. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
211. See id. at 891 (noting that subsection (a)(5) does not allow departure because the
Commission has not set forth its crack-cocaine findings in a guideline policy statement).
212. Id.
213. Id. But see Eura, 2006 WL 440099 at *6 (stating that sentencing outside of the
100:1 ratio would increase disparities).
214. Id. at 892.
215. See Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 896; Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 887; Smith, 359 F.
Supp. 2d at 782.
216. No. 03 CR. 835, 2005 WL 1214280 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005).
217. No. 03 CR. 601, 2005 WL 2560244 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2005).
218. Id. at *2.
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Similar findings were made in another case out of the Southern
District of New York, United States v. Fisher.219 In that case,
Judge Scheindlin found the applicable Guideline range, discussed
past criticisms of the 100:1 ratio, noted that courts had to defer to
Congress with respect to the mandatory minimum, and recog-
nized that after Booker, courts could depart from the Guideline
range, 22 eventually finding that the range "substantially over-
stat[ed] the seriousness of the offense."221 The Eastern District of
New York decided Simon v. United States222 along the same lines.
The court, after discussing the history of the ratio223 and noting
that many of the assumptions underlying the ratio have not held
up,224 imposed a sentence lower than the one provided in the
Guideline range.225
Tennessee has also recognized the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities and the new flexibility afforded courts
since Booker.226 There, district court Judge Greer recognized the
unjustified disparity that results from the 100:1 ratio and found
that, even if the Guidelines were given substantial weight, a rea-
sonable sentence would be one beneath the applicable range.227 In
Indiana, though not required to rely on the 100:1 disparity, dis-
trict court Judge Simon discussed the ratio and sentenced a crack
defendant to a term outside of the low end of the Guideline
range.
228
In a detailed decision out of Rhode Island, another district
court judge discussed the disparity and found that it could not
stand up to an analysis under § 3553(a).229 Judge Smith's decision
219. No. S3 03 CR 1501, 2005 WL 2542916 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005).
220. Id. at *9.
221. See id. at *4-7.
222. 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
223. See id. at 44.
224. Id. at 47.
225. See id. at 49 ("[Tlhe recommended Guidelines sentencing range... substantially
overstates the seriousness of the offense.").
226. See United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
May 6, 2005).
227. See id. at *6.
228. See United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb.
3, 2005). "There can be no doubt that [the 100:1 ratio] issue is extremely controversial and
one which this Court will no doubt face in future sentencings. However, the Court found
that it need not address the 100-to-1 powder to crack cocaine ratio in crafting this sen-
tence." Id. at *4.
229. United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D.R.I. 2005).
20061
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
points out that while the ratio has been criticized for years, the
decision in Booker "gives new vitality to the crack/powder cocaine
sentencing controversy."230 Judge Smith also cited a number of
cases from other district courts that support below-Guideline sen-
tences for crack cases, though "falling short" of imposing one di-
rectly." 1 As in the cases from other districts, Judge Smith fol-
lowed the Commission's recommendations and imposed a 20:1
ratio.232
Though not all courts have used these factors to sentence out-
side of the range, at least one court, choosing to sentence within
the range, has stated that it is not "comfortable with a sentencing
scheme that prescribes significantly lengthier sentences for
crimes involving one type of cocaine than it does for crimes in-
volving the same amount of the drug in another form."233 It
should be recognized, however, that stiff penalties are still im-
posed for the serious offenses.2 34 The decision even noted that the
advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines has "reinvigorated
the debate over the appropriate penalties for crack offenses."235
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also held that
a court may not substitute its own ratio for the policy judgment of
Congress.236 Though the court did not permit a rejection of the
Guideline range, it is important to note that the facts in this case
demonstrated that the defendant was what could be considered a
serious offender-he was a "known source of crack"237 and also
had weapons.23 These circumstances do not make this the opti-
mal case for sentencing a crack defendant outside the Guideline
range. Another important aspect of this case that makes it less
than optimal is that while the lower court did mention that it was
230. Id. at 301.
231. Id. at 306-07.
232. See id. at 307 ("[T]his Court believes a 20:1 ratio (as suggested by the Commission
in its 2002 report) makes the most sense.").
233. United States v. Doe, No. CRIM. 02-0406, 2006 WL 177396, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 26,
2006).
234. See KING & MAUER, supra note 9, at 3. A court is only permitted to sentence out-
side the range when they determine, after consideration of the guideline range and the §
3553(a) factors, that the guideline sentence would be unreasonable-for the most serious
offenses, the defendant will still be subject to the harsh penalties.
235. See Doe, 2006 WL 177396, at *3.
236. Eura, 2006 WL 440099 at *1; cf., Hammel, supra note 193 (concluding that "an
end to the arguments about the injustice of the law is not likely").
237. Eura, 2006 WL 440099 at *1 n.2.
238. See id. at *2.
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not just rejecting the guidelines239 it could have pointed to more
specific circumstances of the case24 ° or explained more fully why
the sentence still serves the purposes of § 3553(a).24' Signifi-
cantly, however, the court did state that "it does not follow that
all defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses must receive a
sentence within the advisory sentencing range.242
The court in United States v. Doe found that it could not substi-
tute the court's policy judgment for that of Congress. It would
therefore not depart from the range, stating that Congress has
repeatedly endorsed harsher sanctions for crack offenders.243
Largely based on the notion that the court could not ignore the
express conclusions of Congress, the Doe court sentenced the de-
fendant within the Guideline range.2" Significantly, the court
made clear that the decision should not be taken to mean that the
Guidelines for crack offenses must be applied in all circum-
stances-only that a departure should be based on case-specific
considerations rather than a categorical disagreement.245 Perhaps
decisions like these speak more strongly to Congress of the need
to take action than those finding room to deviate.246
Like the court in Doe, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in United States v. Pho24" held that a court may not "impose a
sentence outside the advisory ... range based solely on its cate-
gorical rejection of the guidelines' disparate treatment of offenses
involving crack cocaine . . . and powdered cocaine."248 The court
acknowledged that courts now have increased discretion, but
239. See id. at *4 ("I think it is appropriate to note that it is appropriate to consider
this matter as an individual matter, not as a wholesale objection or acceptance of the
guideliens.") (quoting the Joint Appendix at 335-36).
240. See id. at *9 (explaining that "sentencing courts must make individual sentencing
decisions grounded in the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
241. See id. at *5.
242. See id. at *6.
243. See id. at *1. It is important to recognize, though, that harsher penalties are also
given to crack offenders, based, in part, on the mandatory minimum structure.
244. See id. at *1.
245. See id. at *9.
246. Cf. Doe. at *9 ("Perhaps now, prodded by judicial and other observations regarding
the inequity of the current crack and powder-cocaine sentencing structure, Congress will
again consider and (one hopes) address this important issue.").
247. 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
248. Id. at 54 (emphasis added); see also id. at 59 (citing the district court decision
which stated that the only reason to deviate was the disparity between crack and powder).
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noted that the discretion is still not limitless.249 Pure policy judg-
ments should be left to Congress, and therefore, a categorical re-
jection of the ratio would usurp Congressional power.25 ° The court
concluded by making clear that it did not want to diminish the
discretion now available to district courts; its goal was just to
channel the discretion to ensure that it comports with the separa-
tion of powers.251
A majority of courts have still been able to depart from the
100:1 ratio to alleviate the disparity while adequately accounting
for the goals of sentencing. To be clear, these departures did not
simply occur because the range was disliked. One judge stated, "I
did not simply reject the guideline because I did not like it, per-
sonally thought it too harsh, or disagreed that crack posed special
problems. . . . [A]fter carefully reviewing the data . . . , I con-
cluded that the 100:1 ratio did not produce a sentence consistent
with the § 3553(a) factors. .. This is an important statement,
especially if the decision is appealed, as seen in the First Circuit
in Doe. A court does have discretion to sentence outside the
range, but it would need to make clear that the sentence was not
based only on a categorical rejection of or disagreement with the
range, but instead on case-specific circumstances.
What is left is the recognition that many-if not all--courts
want to sentence crack defendants outside of the Guideline range.
The courts, though, must make sure to do so using case-specific
circumstances rather than a policy-based, categorical rejection of
the ratio. The "right" path of analysis would conduct a guideline
analysis and then compare cases.253 One troubling development is
that the Sentencing Commission did not address Booker or the
crack guidelines in its most recently proposed amendments.254
This silence and the failure to codify a new ratio will "ensure ad-
ditional post-Booker disparities" and "breed[ I distrust and disre-
spect."2 55 Some now hope for a circuit split to encourage the Su-
249. See id. at 61.
250. See id. at 62-63.
251. Id. at 65.
252. United States v. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
253. Cocaine cases: Finding Justice, PROV. J. BULL., Dec. 18, 2005, at B1 (detailing the
analysis of Judge Smith in a decision sentencing a crack defendant).
254. See Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-
law-and-policy/2006/week4index.html (Jan. 29, 2006, 20:22 EST).
255. Id.
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preme Court to resolve the issue.256 Perhaps, the more important
question is whether Congress will follow suit of the majority of
courts and clear up the ambiguities left after Booker in favor of a
less disparate ratio.
V. CONCLUSION
The 100:1 ratio, created in 1986, penalizes crack offenses one
hundred times more severely than powder cocaine offenses, set-
ting the same punishment for five grams of crack as for five hun-
dred grams of powder cocaine. This structure can be seen in both
the mandatory minimums found in statutes and in the once man-
datory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The initial formation was
largely brought about due to the War on Drugs launched in the
1980s and public awareness of the growing drug problem. Crack
was seen as a far more dangerous drug. The drug brings with it
violence and crack houses, opens the cocaine market to the young
and to the poor, and causes more addiction.
While crack is still seen as deserving harsher punishment by
many, the size of the disparity has led to much criticism and
many efforts to change the way in which cocaine offenses are sen-
tenced. Many of the initial fears surrounding the creation of the
ratio have not actually been realized. Even though some of them
may be true, they do not justify such a large differential in the
two penalties. Crack comes from powder and would not exist
without it. Crack and powder also provide the same physiological
result, albeit at different speeds. Sentencing crack at such low
quantities has the ironic effect of targeting the low-level dealers
instead of the drug kingpins that Congress intended to target.
Last, but certainly not least, the racial disparity that the sentenc-
ing leads to cannot be justified. The Sentencing Commission has
done much research and issued three reports concluding that the
ratio cannot be justified. Judges and commentators have agreed.
The Sentencing Guidelines, spawned from a movement at-
tempting to curtail judicial discretion, have recently come under
attack. Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in Booker, courts
have been given more flexibility and more discretion in sentenc-
256. See Charles Delafuente, Cracked Sentencing, 5 No. 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, 2 Jan.
27, 2006.
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ing. With the Sentencing Guideline ranges now merely advisory,
courts, after consideration of a list of sentencing factors, are free
to depart from the range. While the federal courts do still need to
comply with the mandatory minimums (also reflecting the 100:1
ratio), the Sentencing Guideline range is often much higher.
Judges can now follow the Sentencing Commission's recommen-
dations-in light of all the research reflecting the negative, un-
justified effects of the ratio-and sentence crack defendants below
the advisory Guideline range. Booker adds to the ongoing, decade-
long debate over crack versus powder, and will, perhaps, add just
enough fuel to the fire to prompt the long-awaited change.
Briton K. Nelson
